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The Case of Natural Obligations
David V. Snyder*
In the twilit land of natural obligations,' suspended between the familiar
realm of positive law on one side and the nether world of natural law on the
other, starting with a working definition is probably a prudent step toward firmer
ground. A "natural obligation" may be defined as an obligation that does not
give rise to an action to enforce it, but that does have some cognizable legal
effects. Natural obligations provide an odd instance where a creditor does have
a right without a remedy, or at least the traditional remedy. This distinction-the
lack of an action-is what separates natural obligations from more familiar civil
obligations,2 which are perfect in their recognition by the law.
Even without the traditional remedy, however, natural obligations are not
bereft of legal effects. That the law grants them some grudging recognition is what
separates natural obligations from obligations that lie purely in the moral realm.
These obligations, sometimes called "moral" or "imperfect" obligations, have no
effect at law. For example, the obligation to help a feeble fellow citizen cross a
busy intersection may be binding in "the forum of the conscience,"3 but that duty
garners no recognition in the eyes of the law. In an attempt to avoid confusion, this
Essay will refer to such obligations as "philosophical obligations." The other terms
sometimes used for such obligations have second meanings that are similar to the
meaning of "natural obligation," which hardly seems helpful when using a phrase
to denote obligations that are distinct from natural obligations. (The closest
common-law equivalent to a natural obligation is called a "moral obligation,"" and
the closest German equivalent is sometimes referred to as an "imperfect
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1. See Georges Ripert, La Rigle Morale clans les Obligations Civiles § 186, at 385 (1935) (with
respect to natural obligations, "[w]e are in a nether region of the law" between night and day) (my
translation).
2. This Essay will refer to obligations accorded full recognition by the law as "civil obligations,"
as is commonly done. As used here, the term "civil obligation" should not be confused with the law
governing only Roman citizens. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing the ius
civile).
3. The phrase comes from Robert Joseph Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations 2 n.(a)
(William D. Evans trans., London, A. Strahan for Joseph Butterworth & J. Cooke 1806) ("le for de
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4. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86 cmt. a (1981). See generally id. §§ 82-94.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
obligation."') Although the point is obvious, it is important to note explicitly at tie
outset that not all philosophical obligations are natural obligations.6
As should be apparent from this brief introduction to natural obligations,
they are sui generis. This unique character is the foundation of their appeal for
scholars7 and is part of the reason that examining them sheds additional light on
the Romanist tradition in Louisiana. Their exceptionally close tie to natural lawis part of the basis for the parallels between the Roman and Louisiana law of
natural obligations. There are also obvious parallels in the substantive law of
natural obligations in both the Roman and Louisiana systems, including the
particular natural obligations recognized and the effects accorded to them. In
addition, because of the relation of natural obligations to concepts of natural law(as applied to particular facts), parallels in the legal method of Rome and
Louisiana can be detected to an unusual degree, even in the mixed regime foundin Louisiana. For the recognition of natural obligations has been an invitation
to the courts to create law, much as the men charged with administering the lawin Rome were largely responsible for the development of private law quite apart
from any action by a legislator or legislature.
I. THE PARALLEL DERIVATION OF NATURAL OBLIGATIONS IN ROMAN AND
LOUISIANA LAW: THE ROLE OF NATURAL LAW
As implied by its name, the Roman institution of the natural obligation, or
obligatio naturalis, "was a direct result of the conception of ius naturale"' and
5. 1 Sadl Litvinoff, Obligations § 329, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969) [hereinafter
Litvinoff]. Professor Litvinoffs 1969 treatise contains a magisterial treatment of natural obligations,including comparitist discussions. Unfortunately, the discussion of natural obligations in the current
edition of the treatise is not as thorough. See I Sadl Litvinoff, Obligations §§ 2.1-.45, in 5 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1992).
6. See generally Carey J. Ellis, Jr., Note, Contracts-Distinction Between Natural and Moral
Obligations, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 310 (1942).
7. Natural obligations have long received the attention of Continental writers. E.g., PierreCornioley, Naturalis obligatio: Essai sur l'origine et 1'6volution de la notion en droit romain (1964);Giovanni E. Longo, Ricerche sull' "Obligatio Naturalis" (1962); Marcel Planiol, L'assimilationprogressive de l'obligation naturelle et du devoir moral, 42 Revue critique de 16gislation et dejurisprudence 152 (1913). Louisiana authors have also written on the subject. E.g., Fontaine Martin,Jr., Natural Obligations, 15 Tul. L. Rev. 497 (1941); Ernest G. LaFleur, Jr., Comment, NaturalObligations, 12 La. L. Rev. 79 (1951); John P. Woodley, Note, Natural Obligations-Sufficiency A.Consideration, 7 La. L. Rev. 445 (1947).
8. W.W. Buckland & Peter Stein, A Text-Book of Roman Law § 20, at 55 (1963). One mightdebate this point, and indeed it was debated to some extent at the colloquium. Given the very name
"'obligatio naturals," it would seem difficult to quarrel over whether there is at least some link.between the Roman conception of natural obligations and the ius naturale, and I do not believe that
any of the participants would do so. Buckland's statement, then, can be taken at face value.Undoubtedly, however, some natural obligations are so called but would not be recognized by theius naturale, especially those dealing with the obligations of slaves. If the ius naturale would not




its close cousin, the ius gentium.9 The lus naturale, or natural law, is a slippery
concept, especially for the modem grasp. Even the Romans used the phrase ius
naturale in several different senses. The concept might best be defined by what
it is not. The ius civile is the law that applied to Roman citizens. The ius
gentium, on the other hand, is comprised of the rules that apply to everyone,
regardless of their citizenship. Although the ius naturale and the ius gentium are
close, cousins, they are quite distinct. The lus naturale, in the sense that is
relevant for purposes of this Essay, might be considered the law that should,
ideally, apply to everyone. The example of slavery provides a neat illustration:
in the Roman mind slavery was a fact, and was recognized everywhere by the
law. It was thus an institution of the ius gentium. Because the Romans
conceived of people as naturally free, however, slavery was not a part of the ius
naturale.'0
Like the Romans, the Louisiana law has linked natural obligations with
natural law. The Civil Code article in effect from 1825 to 1984 read, "A natural
obligation is one which can not be enforced by action, but which is binding on
the party who makes it, in conscience and according to natural justice."'1 The
reference in the Code to "natural justice" is only the slightest step from "natural
law," or ius naturale.
That the Louisiana Civil Code would expressly refer to natural law is
remarkable.' The Civil Code in particular and the civil law in general
emphasize the will of the legislature, and thus positive law, as opposed to
sources so ineffable as natural law. 3  Moreover, the Code in eschewing
philosophical obligations underscores that obligations must be recognized by the
positive law if they are to be accorded any legal cognizance: "If the duty created
9. Digest of Justinian (Dig.] 50.17.84.1 (Paul, Quaestionun 3).
10. Dig. 12.6.64 (Tryphoninus, Disputationum 7). See generally Barry Nicholas, An Introduction
to Roman Law 54-55 (1992).
11. La. Civ. Code art. 1750(2) (1825); La. Civ. Code art. 1757(2) (1870). This Essay ignores
minor differences in punctuation between the 1825 and 1870 provisions.
The English quoted in the text is the official translation of the original French: "L 'obligation
naturelle est celle qul, sans donner un droit d'action, lie la pattie qui l'a contracthe. dans le for de
la conscience, et selon lajustice naturelle." La. Civ. Code art. 1750(2) (1825). This article appears
to come from Pothier. Litvinoff, supra note 5, § 339. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
12. Recognition by the Code might be distinguished from the recognition of moral rights by
courts or doctrinal writers. See generally Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations: A
Property-Law Framework for the Protection of Authors'Moral Rights, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 935, 938-39
(1995) (droit moral, recognizing authors' and artists' rights in intellectual property, was judicially
created on the Continent).
13. Under the current Code, legislation and custdm are the sources of the law, and legislation is
the more important. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1-3. Previous Louisiana Codes had similar provisions.
La. Civ. Code arts. 1-2 (1870); La. Civ. Code arts. 1-2 (1825). Under the 1825 and 1870 Codes, a
judge could resort "to natural law and reason, or received usages" only when the positive law was
silent. La. Civ. Code art. 21 (1870); La. Civ. Code art. 21 (1825) ("la loi naturelle et d la raison,
ou aux usages retus"). The possibility of an appeal to natural law has been entirely eliminated from
the current Code. La. Civ. Code art. 4 cmt. (b).
1995)
LOUISIANA LW RE VIEW
by the obligation operates only on the moral sense, without being enforced by
any positive law, it is called an imperfect obligation, and creates no right of
action, nor has it any legal operation."" Even within the context of Louisiana
law generally, the natural obligation is an unusual creature.
From a wider perspective, this Code article is also noteworthy. It was
enacted in the wake of a prominent American debate on natural law. The role
of natural justice had been expounded by Justice Chase as an important limit on
legislative power." Justice Iredell at the time rejected such notions as too
"speculative.""6  Justice Iredell's view seemed to prevail in Marbury v.
Madison, when the existence of written, positive law was used to justify the
power of judicial review, implicitly rejecting the notion that the Supreme Court
would apply unwritten natural law concepts to strike down a legislative act."
Although Supreme Court opinions continued to allude to natural law concepts,
the Court seemed to be moving away from them and generally resisted basing
a holding on such principles." In this context, Louisiana's apparently unhesi-
tating adoption of natural justice as an explicit source for obligations is not only
remarkable but also emphasizes that the Louisiana redactors' eyes were firmly
fixed on well-established Romanist ideas.
The 1984 revision 9 of the obligations articles alters the wording of the
relevant provision on natural obligations, but the rewording does not appear to
reflect a substantial, if any, change in theory. "[M]oral duty"2 is now cited as
the source for natural obligations, instead of "natural justice." The change in the
reference follows the language employed by modem doctrinal writers,2' but the
distinction between obligations founded on moral duty, as opposed to natural
justice, is difficult to discern. In these modem times, which are especially
skeptical of natural law and similar ephemeral concepts,2 the connection of
14. La. Civ. Code art. 1750(l) (1825); La. Civ. Code art. 1757(l) (1870). The French reads, "Si
le devoir cri par /'obligation n est recommandh que par la morale, et n est imposh par aucune lot
positive, il et appeli obligation imparfaite laquelle ne donne aucun droit d'action, et ne prodult
aucun effet lgal." La. Civ. Code art. 1750(1) (1825).
15. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 387-89 (1798) (Chase, J.).
16. Id. at 398-99 (Iredell, J.).
17. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
18. Compare, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) ("certaingreat principles of justice, whose authority is universally acknowledged") with Satterlee v.Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 413-14 (1829) (Washington, J.) (declining to follow Fletcher).
See generally David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years
1789-1888 ch. 5 (1985).
19. See 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § I (codified at La. Civ. Code arts. 1760.1762).
20. La. Civ. Code art. 1760. 0
21. Id. cmt. e (citing Planiol, supra note 7; Ripert, supra note 1).
22. As mentioned above, the current Civil Code eliminated the reference to natural law in the
Preliminary Title because "ft]he term 'natural law' . . . has no defined meaning in Louisianajurisprudence." La. Civ. Code art. 4 cmt. b. Indeed, even a United States Supreme Court Justice's
nomination was cast in doubt because of his supposed belief in natural law. See, e.g., Joseph R.
[Vol. 56
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these.Louisiana provisions to natural-law concepts betrays the ancient Roman
heritage of this part of the law.
II. PARALLELS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF NATURAL OBLIGATIONS IN
LOUISIANA AND ROME
A. The Obligations Recognized as Natural Obligations
That not every obligation binding in conscience is recognized even as a
natural obligation is an obvious point, but it gives rise to a difficult question.
Which ones should gain recognition by the law? Legal systems have been
occupied for millenia in determining the criteria to distinguish different kinds of
obligations: those accorded the full status of a civil obligation, the partial status
of a natural obligation, or the complete lack of status of a philosophical
obligation. The question remains an important one for modem legal regimes as
well.' Aside from the impossibility of knowing the precise content of the
natural law, not all obligations that would be recognized in the ideal world of the
natural law could be recognized as natural obligations, under the applied law of
either Rome or Louisiana. The law must therefore choose which obligations to
recognize. The obligations that the Roman and Louisiana systems recognize as
natural obligations are strikingly similar.
1. Natural Obligations Recognized at Roman Law
The list of natural obligations recognized in Roman times was gradually
formed and is distinctly haphazard, but most of the major natural obligations that
came to be recognized might be divided into the following groups. The reason
for the groupings, and the rationale for which obligations are placed in each
group, will become apparent in the next section, which considers the obligations
recognized by the Louisiana Civil Codes.24
The natural obligations most typical of Group I are those that arise from
certain nude pacts, or promises lacking the requisite formalities. Not every
nudum pactum created a natural obligation, but some did. 5 Examples of nude
Biden Jr., Law and Natural Law: Questions for Judge Tomas, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1991, at C1;
Robert P. George, Judges and Natural Law, Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 1991, at A17.
23. For a discussion of one of these questions with respect to Louisiana law, see generally
Contracts, supra note 6.
24. Others have also classified natural obligations. E.g., I Friedrich von Savigny, Le Droit des
Obligations §§ 9-11 (Paris, Auguste Durand 1863). The reasons for those classifications are different
from the purposes of this Essay, and the categorization employed here therefore differs from previous
classifications.
25. Buckland & Stein, supra note 8, § 189(c), at 553.
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pacts that resulted in natural obligations are pacts for interest on a loan 6 and
a slave's naked promise to pay her master for her liberty." Other natural
obligations that might be classified in Group I are the result of rules of law that
extinguished civil obligations in certain situations but that left a natural obligation
instead. A few instances will demonstrate the point: After a plaintiff brought
his case, the civil obligation supporting the claim was often extinguished, and the
right of action sustituted for the old obligation. This stage of litigation was
called litis contestatio.2" If some impediment to final judgment arose, however,
the plaintiff could collect neither under the old obligation nor the suit. In at least
some cases a natural obligation survived, as when the plaintiff lost through a
procedural error.29 A natural obligation also remained when the judge's error
deprived the plaintiff of a remedy.3"
A natural obligation could also survive when a civil obligation was
extinguished by a person's change in status. For instance, if a person were
adopted or emancipated, he would undergo a change in civil status or capitis
deminutio minima.3' In such a case, natural obligations could replace civil
obligations that were lost as a result of the change in status.32 Similarly, civil
obligations that were lost by confusion (the merger of debtor's and creditor's
rights in one person) could leave a natural obligation.33
Group II includes the earliest natural obligations recognized by the RomaM
law.34 Members of the same family, that is, those in polestate, could not enter
into civil obligations with each other, but the law recognized a natural obligation
in such situations. 3 In addition, as a result of abuses by a certain Macedo, the
Senatusconsultun Macedonianum prohibited a son in potestate from contracting
a monetary loan.36 The son was still naturally obligated to repay such a loan,
26. Dig. 46.3.5.2 (Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 43). See also infra note 52 and accompanying text.
27. See Dig. 16.1.13 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Provinciale) (the slave's natural obligation is necessary
to support the accessory expromissio).
28. W.W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law § 167, at 401-02 (2d ed. 1939).
29. See Dig. 20.1.27 (Marcellus, Dig. 5) (the natural obligation would support extraordinary
remedy granted by practor). See also infra note 61.
30. Dig. 12.6.28 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32); Dig. 12.6.60 (Paul, Quaestionum 3).
31. Buckland, supra note 28, § 32, at 85. The change was only "minima" because it involved
a mere loss of family rights; greater losses, such as loss of liberty, could result in capitis deminutio
maxima or media. Id.
32. Bucldand & Stein, supra note 8, § 189(i), at 553-54.
33. Id. at 554. Whether confusio resulted in a natural obligation is subject to some doubt,
however, as are some of the other instances mentioned in the text. Id.
34. Great debate has raged over when Roman law first recognized natural obligations. The
bibliography in Cornioley, supra note 7, lists the most prominent contestants in the debate. The
consensus seems to be that the earliest natural obligations were recognized in the classical period
sometime after Labeo. Buckland & Stein, supra note 8, § 189, at 552, 554 & nn.6-7. (Labeo lived
during the reign of Augustus. Hans J. Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction 104 (1951).).
35. Dig. 4.5.2.2 (Ulpian. Ad Edictum 12); Dig. 12.6.38 (Africanus, Quaestionum 9).
36. Dig. 14.6.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 29).
[Vol. 56
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however." Others were similarly situated: Pupilli who were past the age when
they could not reason but who still were not endowed with complete capacity3"
were able to contract but required the approval or auctoritas of a guardian if they
could be put in a worse position." Thus, pupilli who lacked auctoritas and
who did not profit were not subject to a civil obligation, but a natural obligation
did result from the transaction. ' o Minores (under twenty-five)" appear to have
been similarly situated.4 '
The law relating to slaves, which has been the subject of much learned
discourse at the colloquium,43 also provides a particularly interesting example
of natural obligations in Group II. Slaves could be highly educated in Roman
times, and such slaves commonly engaged in commerce for the benefit of their
masters. They could well be charged with the management of large business-
es.' Eventually, as a result of praetorian reforms, their transactions could
result in the civil obligation of the master to the extent of the fund (called the
peculum)S that slaves might be given for their own account, but the ownership
of which remained in the master." The existence of the peculium in this
circumstance made slaves particularly useful for engaging in commerce because
limited liability trading (liability being limited to the peculium) was thus possible
centuries before the creation of the corporation. '  As might be imagined,
however, slaves' transactions were not always limited to the peculium, and the
fact that the law considered the slave to have contracted a natural obligation
could therefore become significant."'
37. Dig. 12.6.40 (Marcian, Regularum 3); Buckland & Stein, supra note 8, § 163, at 466, and
§ 189, at 553.
38. Originally the time that the child became capable of reasoning was a question of fact to be
settled on a case-by-case basis, but the later law set the age at seven. Nicholas, supra note 10, at 93.
39. Id.
40. Dig. 36.2.25.1 (Papinian, Quaestionum 18); Dig. 46.3.95.4 (Papinian, Quaestionum 28). But
see Dig. 12.6.41 (Neratius, Membranarum 6).
41. Dig. 46.3.95.3 (Papinian, Quaestionum 28).
42. Buckland & Stein, supra note 8, § 189(0, at 553.
43. See Judith Kelleher Schafer, Roman Roots of Louislana's Slave Law, 56 La. L. Rev. 409
(1995); Vernon V. Palmer. Roman Law Foundations of the Code Noir, 56 La. L. Rev. 363 (1995);
Hans Baade, The Bifurcated Romanist Tradition of Slavery in Louisiana, 70 TUl. L. Rev.
(forthcoming May 1996).
44. Nicholas, supra note 10, at 70.
45. Dig. 15.1.41 (Ulpian, Ad Sabinum.43).
46. Nicholas, supra note 10, at 202. Slaves' transactions could also be binding on the master
when the master expressed his consent to the contracting party. Id.
47. See id.
48. Dig. 12.6.13 (Paul, Ad Sabinum 10); Dig. 15.1.50.2 (Papinian, Quaestionum 9); Dig. 44.7.10
(Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 47); Dig. 45.1.126.2 (Paul, Quaestionum 3); see Dig. 46.1.35 (Paul, Ad
Plautium 2); Dig. 44.2.21.4 (Pomponius, Ad Sabinumn 31); see also Dig. 12.6.64 (Tryphoninus,
Disputationum 7) (master can contract natural obligation to his slave). See generally Buckland &
Stein, supra note 8, § 189(a), at 552. In assessing some of the cited Digest provisions, one must
remember that accessory obligations could exist in these cases only if a natural obligation would
support them, as a civil obligation would be lacking. See also Infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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The list may be rounded out with the addition of a third "group," although
Group III consists of only one item. A claim at Roman law might be barred by
time. In that case, the civil obligation thus extinguished could leave in its place
a natural obligation.49 With this example, the classification of the most
salient" natural obligations recognized at Roman law is complete, and we turn
to the natural obligations recognized by Louisiana.
2. Natural Obligations Recognized by Louisiana Law
From 1825 to 1984, the Louisiana Civil Code had one article governing what
natural -obligations would be recognized. It listed four "kinds" that would be
accorded legal cognizance:
Natural obligations are of four kinds:
1. Such obligations as the law has rendered invalid for the want
of certain forms or for some reason of general policy, but which are not
in themselves immoral or unjust;
2. Such as are made by persons having the discretion necessary
to enable them to contract, but who are yet rendered incapable of doing
so by some provision of law;
3. When the action is barred by prescription, a natural obligation
still subsists, although the civil obligation is extinguished;
4. There is also a natural obligation on those who inherit an
estate, either under a will or by legal inheritance, to execute the
donations or other dispositions which the former owner had made, but
which are defective for want of form only.5 '
49. Buckland & Stein, supra note 8, § 189, at 554. Professor Hans Ankum also noted the parallel
between Roman and Louisiana law with respect to the natural obligation resulting from prescription
when he delivered his paper, Historical Origins of the Louisiana Law of Contracts, at the colloquium.
50. The list enumerated here is not exhaustive; natural obligations that are of relatively little
importance, or that shed no light on Louisiana law, have been omitted.
51. La. Civ. Code art. 1751 (1825); La. Civ. Code art. 1758 (1870). The original French version
reads:
Les obligations naturelles sont de quatre sortes:
1. Celles que la loi a difendues ou diclaries nulles par difaut de forme ou par
quelque raison de bien public, mais qui en elles-mimes nesontpas immorales ou injustes;
2. Celes qui sont faites par des personnes qui ont assez de raison pour pouvoir
contracter, mais que la loi n 'en a pas encore rendues capables;
3. Celles dont le droit d 'action et ,telnt par la prescription, mais qui subsiste encore
dans le for de la conscience aprks cette extinction;
4. Cellas des h~ritiers ligitimes ou testamentaires, qui, dans le for de la conscience,
doivent exicuter les donations ou autres dispositions de leur pr~dcesseur qui ne sont
nulles que par difaut de forme.
La. Civ. Code art. 1751 (1825). Professor Litvinoff has found the influence of Toullier in this
provision. Litvinoff, supra note 5, § 339, at 592 & n.9 (citing 3 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Franais
Suivant l'Ordre du Code 467-74 (1833)). 1 regret not having access to a sufficiently early edition
of Toullier in order to verify his influence on the 1825 version of the Code.
(Vol. 56
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The rationale behind the groups listed in the previous section should now be
clear. Paragraph 1 of the cited Code article concerns obligations that would be
civil obligations, except for some rule of law that prevents the formation of a
civil obligation for policy reasons. A nude pact provides a literally classic
example, and the Louisiana courts even recognized a natural obligation to pay
interest not stipulated, precisely as the Romans did."2
The other natural obligations listed in Group I-those resulting from litis
contestatio, capitis deminutio, and confuisio-also fit within the parameters of
paragraph. 1. Without the rules extinguishing the civil obligation in litis
contestatio, capitis deminutio, and confusio, serious legal and analytical problems
would arise. To take the example of litis contestatio, the law could hardly
provide both a right of action and a civil obligation giving rise to another right
of action, and the original civil obligation was therefore extinguished for a reason
of general policy having nothing to do with immorality. A similar analysis can
be applied to capitis deminutio and confsio: civil obligations were extinguished
for reasons of general policy, but natural obligations subsisted. These natural
obligations, recognized by the Roman law, were the precursors to the natural
obligations recognized by paragraph 1.
Group II and paragraph 2 also match, as do Group III and paragraph 3. The
examples listed in Group II, involving family members, minors, slaves, 3 and
pupilli, consist of persons who have the factual capacity to reason but not the
legal capacity to contract, at least in the circumstances enumerated above. And
"Group" III is precisely the same situation as paragraph 3: when a civil
obligation is extinguished by prescription, the natural obligation remains.
So far as we have been able to discover, paragraph 4 had no exact
counterpart in Roman law. Interestingly, the situation is recorded in Roman
literature outside the realm of the law; Pliny addressed the situation in two of his
letters. In one, the testator had failed to confirm codicils to his will, but Pliny
emphasized the importance of observing the wishes of the decedent, even if the
statement of those wishes was legally void.54 In the second situation, the
testator had attempted a donation that was legally void, but Pliny promised to
pay his share anyway." Even aside from Pliny's extra-legal practice, paragraph
4 of the Louisiana law does not represent a major departure. It is essentially the
52. Garland v. Lockett, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 40, 41-42 (La. 1826).
53. We did not discover any cases involving natural obligations of slaves under Louisiana law.
The Code does not strictly prohibit such a result, and the antebellum laws recognized the concept of
the peculium. Schafer, supra note 43, at 412; Palmer, supra note 43, at 380. The lack of cases
dealing with the scenario is not surprising. Slaves played a far different role in Louisiana than in
Rome. Schafer, supra note 43, at 410. As Professor Nicholas observed, "The labourer on the
plantation provides little scope for the private law. It is quite otherwise with the manager of a large
business." Nicholas, supra note 10, at 70.
54. Pliny, Letter [Ep.] 2.16. I would like to thank Professor Dennis Kehoe for the references to
and explanations of Pliny's letters.
55. Id. 5.7; see also id. 4.10.
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same situation as in paragraph 1, but the natural obligation lies in the heir or
legatee instead of the testator.
The four kinds of natural obligations discussed above remained the law of
Louisiana until the revision of 1984.56 The revision refined the law but left its
essence intact.57 Instead of listing the kinds of obligations, the Code now
provides a generic article: "A natural obligation arises from circumstances in
which the law implies a particular moral duty to render a performance." Se
Examples are given, including the cases of the obligation extinguished by
prescription, the obligation incurred by one endowed with discernment but
lacking capacity, and the natural obligation of heirs and legatees to fulfill void
dispositions. The Louisiana law, as it has been exposed above, remains the
same.
59
The natural obligations recognized by Louisiana, then, are hardly identical
to those recognized by Rome. The influence of the Roman law, though, is easy
to detect in the natural obligations that were recognized by the Code for over 150
years, and they continue as viable natural obligations after the revision. This
aspect of the Louisiana law owes a significant debt to Roman forebears, as does
the law that governs the effects of natural obligations.
B. The Effects of Natural Obligations
At Roman law, different natural obligations could produce different
effects.6 The one effect that was definitely common to all was that a payment
made on account of a natural obligation could not be recovered; to put it in
Roman terms, no condictio indebiti lay.6 As a corollary, the Romans consid-
ered amounts transferred because of a natural obligation a payment.62 Roman
law also allowed at least some natural obligations to support accessory
obligations like suretyship and pignorative contracts.63 Natural obligations
56. See 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § I (codified at La. Civ. Code arts. 1760-1762).
57. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1760 & cmt. (a), 1761 & cmt. (a), 1762 & cmts. (a)-(d).
58. La. Civ. Code art. 1760.
59. The refinements made by the revision are not discussed above. See La. Civ. Code art. 1762
& cmts. (a)-(d).
60. Buckland & Stein, supra note 8, § 189, at 552.
61. Id.; see Dig. 44.7.10 (Ulpian, Ad Sabinumn 47); Dig. 46.1.16.4 (Julian, Dig. 53). The latter
provision, like Dig. 20.1.27 (Marcellus, Dig. 5), requires an explanation of the working definition
given at the beginning of this Essay. Julian's reference to a natural obligation giving rise to an action
probably refers to an action against the surety, whose accessory obligation is supported by the naturd
obligation. Marcellus's reference, including Ulpian's note, suggests that the obligation is natural and
not civil because no remedy exists to enforce it. That the praetor might grant a remedy would
(according to the definition used in this Essay) convert the natural obligation into a civil one. Before
any action by the praetor (and that he would take such action is merely speculative), however, the
obligation would remain natural.
62. See Litvinoff, supra note 5, § 307(2), at 553; 2 Ambroise Colin & Henri Capitant, Cours
l6mentaire de Droit Civil Francais 336 (10th ed. 1948).
63. Dig. 46.1.16.3 (Julian, Dig. 53); Litvinoff, supra note 5, § 307(3), at 553.
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could also support a novation." In certain circumstances, natural obligations
also came to have other effects, such as set-off.65
The effects of natural obligations under Louisiana law, from 1825 to the
present, are more limited, but the effects that are recognized show the impress
of the Roman law. The Code article in effect from 1825 to 1984 provided,
Although natural obligations can not be enforced by action, they
have the following effect[s]:
1. No suit will lie to recover what has been paid, or given in
compliance with a natural obligation.
2. A natural obligation is a sufficient consideration for a new con-
tract.6
The current article, promulgated as part of the 1984 revision,67 reproduces the
substance of the former article:"
A natural obligation is not enforceable by judicial action. Never-
theless, whatever has been freely performed in compliance with a
natural obligation may not be reclaimed.
A contract made for the performance of a natural obligation is
onerous.
69
The first provision of both Louisiana articles precisely describes the situation
at Roman law."0 The condictio indebiti, which allowed a plaintiff to recover
sums paid but not owed,7 did not lie. The second paragraph follows from the
Roman recognition that an amount transferred on account of a natural obligation
is a payment, not a donation. The doctrine of cause, as used in modem civil-law
systems, and the common-law consideration doctrine obviously did not exist at
Roman law. The statements in the Louisiana Civil Codes, however, do no more
than allow the payment to be considered a payment, rather than a donation.
The effects recognized by Louisiana are without question more constrained
than those recognized in Roman times. For example, natural obligations cannot
64. Dig. 46.2.1 (Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 46); Longo, supra note 7, at 265.
65. Dig. 16.2.6 (Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 30).
66. La. Civ. Code art. 1759 (1870); see La. Civ. Code art. 1752 (1825). The bracketed "s" in the
text corrects a mistranslation from the original French:
Les obligations naturelles, quoiqu'on n 'en puisse exiger I'ex~cution par les voies
lUgales, produisent les effets suivans:
1. On n 'a point d'action pour recouvrer ce qul a dM payg en vertu d'une obligation
naturelle,
2. Une obligation naturelle et une cause suffisante pour un nouveau contrat.
Id.
67. 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 1.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 1761 cmt. (a).
69. La. Civ. Code art. 1761.
70. See Litvinoff, supra note 5, § 356, at 620.
71. A.M. Prichard, Leage's Roman Private Law 385 (3d ed. 1961).
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support accessory obligations in modem legal systems." In the effects that it
has accorded to natural obligations, though, Louisiana has followed the Romanist
tradition. The Roman impress has left its mark.
III. PARALLELS IN LEGAL METHOD
The unusual character of natural obligations has led to an unusual method
of legal development in Louisiana. Despite the acknowledged Romanist tradition
apparent in many civil-law jurisdictions, the legal method employed by the
Romans is in many ways more closely aligned with that used by the common
law, which is ironically the usual foil for the civil law. The importance of cases
and judicial decisionmaking in the common law has become part of the
"traditional mythology" of that legal system."3 The case-centered approach of
the Roman lawyers" is not far removed from the common-law approach. The
relative independence of civilian systems from case law,7" on the other hand,
and the relatively exalted place of jurists7 6 and legislatures" in such systems,
is just as well established.7" In the case of natural obligations, however, the
legal method employed by Louisiana bears a much closer resemblance to Roman
law than is usual.
The case-based approach of much Roman legal development is not hard to
discern. The jurists' literature is largely based on cases, many of which arose
in fact. One-third of the Digest is comprised of their problematic and other case-
based literature.79 In addition, much of a jurist's time would be occupied with
providing responses to questions in particular cases that were in litigation, as
evidenced by the existence of the ius respondend ° Even after the role of the
72. Litvinoff, supra note 5, §§ 326-327, at 574-76.
73. Peter G. Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: A Historical Interpretation, 46 La. L. Rev.
241, 241-42 (1985).
74. Nicholas, supra note 10, at 33.
75. Compare the importance of judge-made law in the common law. See, e.g., R.C. van
Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Private Law 136 (D.E.L. Johnston trans., 1992); Roscoe
Pound, The Development ofAmerican Law and its Deviation from English Law, 67 L.Q.R. 49,49-50
(1951).
76. See generally Stein, supra note 73.
77. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1-3 (legislation and custom are the sources of the law, and legislation
is the more important). Compare van Caenegem, supra note 75, at 136 (at common law, "[t]he role
of legislation was merely ancillary"); Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 46 (192 1)
(explaining skeptical view of common law with respect to legislation).
78. The traditional mythology is sometimes reassessed. See, e.g., F.H. Lawson, A Common
Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law ch. 11 (1955). There can be little doubt, however, that the summary
in the text represents the usual view of the civil- and common-law systems. Nevertheless, the reader
should note that this Essay does not attempt to cite the many works that compare Roman, civil, and
common law and that discuss more fully the points in the text.
79. Nicholas, supra note 10, at 33. Admittedly, some of the cases in the literature were hypothetical.
80. See Wolff, supra note 34, at 116. The lus respondendi made a jurist's opinion binding at
least in the case in which he issued his response..
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classical jurist was eclipsed, rescripts and decreta issued in particular cases
continued to play an important part in the development of the law."
No essay on Roman law would be complete without a caveat about the
length of the Roman period, the constantly changing nature of the law during that
period, and the consequent difficulty in discussing exactly what the "Roman law"
was. Still, regardless of the period in which the various natural obligations
developed,' the central role of case-based legal development cannot be denied.
The very list of recognized natural obligations, which was gradually formed 3
and which is haphazard in terms of the obligations recognized, strongly suggests
that the particular natural obligations came to be recognized because of cases that
had actually arisen.
The Louisiana law has undergone a similar development. The list of four
kinds of natural obligations in the 1825 and 1870 Codes led to a controversy
over whether the list was exclusive or illustrative. The more authoritative view,
espoused by the Louisiana Supreme Court, suggested that only the natural
obligations that were enumerated in the Code would be granted recognition."
The better view, however, was that the list was merely illustrative, and that the
courts were free to recognize natural obligations in appropriate circumstances
even when they fell outside the four categories listed."
Despite the apparent disagreement over this question, the courts (including
the Louisiana Supreme Court) indisputably recognized natural obligations from
outside the codal list. As Professor Litvinoff has observed," for example,
Louisiana courts found natural obligations to pay debts discharged in bankrupt-
cy17 and to remunerate long employment at low wages." Payments by the
federal government to a disabled veteran have also been recognized as being paid
in compliance with a natural obligation."
81. Nicholas, supra note 10, at 18.
82. To make matters more difficult, there has been great debate over when the Roman law
recognized natural obligations. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83. Buckland & Stein, supra note 8, § 189, at 552.
84. Breaux v. Breaux, 218 La. 795, 803-04, 51 So. 2d 73, 76-77 (1950); Succession of Buns, 199
La. 1081, 1094, 7 So. 2d 359, 363 (1942); Succession of Miller v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.. 110 La.
652, 657, 34 So. 723, 725 (1903).
85. Atkins v. Commissioner (In re Atkins' Estate), 30 F.2d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1929). See
generally Litvinoff, supra note 5, §§ 351-354, at 610-18. Professor Willem Zwalve pointed out at
the colloquium that a growing body of law regarding natural obligations has mushroomed in the
context of tax law in the Netherlands. The Louisiana law of natural obligations has also had an
impact in the tax realm, reaching back into the nineteenth century. E.g., John Kyle Steamboat Co.
v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 688, 689 (C.C.D. La. 1876) (No. 7,354).
86. Litvinoff, supra note 5, § 354, at 618.
87. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 433, 21 So. 2d 485, 488 (1945); Bach v. Cohn, 3 La. Ann.
101, 102 (1848); see Glenn v. Dunbar's Adm'x, 10 La. Ann. 253, 255 (1855); Swift & Co. v.
Abrams, 3 La. App. 635, 638 (2d Cir. 1926); see also Linton v. Stanton, 4 La. Ann. 401,406 (1849);
Blanc v. Banks, 10 Rob. 115, 115-16 (1845).
88. Barthe v. Succession of Lacroix, 29 La. Ann. 326, 327 (1877).
89. Succession of Scott, 231 La. 381, 392-93, 91 So. 2d 574, 577-78 (1956).
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The revision of the natural obligations articles further legitimates the case-
by-case approach to the recognition of natural obligations. The new Code
provisions dispel any doubts about the illustrative character of the natural
obligations listed in the Code. No longer are specific kinds of natural obligations
enumerated; rather, Article 1760 describes the circumstances in which a natural
obligation may be found (when there is "a particular moral duty to render a
performance").' 0 Article 1762 provides a few "illustrative" "examples."'" The
doctrine that underlies the Code recognizes a growing association between moral
duties and legal obligations.92 The present Code therefore encourages the courts
to recognize new obligations in particular cases.
Louisiana, as a mixed jurisdiction, already shares more with the Roman
case-based method than purer civilian jurisdictions. The flexible character of
natural obligations makes the role of cases even more pronounced in this area of
the law. Louisiana thus has a developing list of recognized natural obligations.
The particular ones that are accorded recognition will no doubt continue to have
a somewhat haphazard character, as does anything that is dependent on cases for
its development. In light of the encouragement that the current Code gives the
courts, the law governing natural obligations in Louisiana should continue to
grow by the same method that saw the rise and expansion of natural obligations
in Rome.
IV. CONCLUSION
One could hardly argue that the Roman law of natural obligations came
unaltered into the Louisiana law. The law has changed in light of modern
circumstances, and natural erosion and accretion are inevitable. Still, the law in
Louisiana bears the unmistakable stamp of the Roman law, largely as received
through intermediate European sources. For the most part, the contours of the
Roman stamp are quite sharp, where the Roman law on natural obligations has
come into the Louisiana law with little alteration from intervening centuries.
Although its impress is not as crisp in some areas, the Roman influence is still
easily discernible. The substantive parallels are inexact, but both the obligations
recognized as natural obligations and the effects accorded to them demonstrate
the similarities of Roman and Louisiana law. The importance of cases in the
development of the law also provides an unusual parallel between a modern
civilian jurisdiction and the Roman legal method. Finally, the distinguishing
mark of the natural obligation-its conceptual link to the ius naturale, natural
justice, and moral duty-shows how Louisiana has followed in the Romanist
tradition.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 1760.
91. La. Civ. Code art. 1762 & cmt. (b).
92. La. Civ. Code art. 1760 cmt. (e) (citing Planiol, supra note 7; Ripert, supra note 1).
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